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Abstract. Computing grids are large-scale, highly-distributed, often hierarchi-
cal, platforms. At such scales, failures are no longer exceptions, but part of the
normal behavior. When designing software for grids, developers have to take fail-
ures into account. It is crucial to make experiments at a large scale, with various
volatility conditions, in order to measure the impact of failures on the whole sys-
tem. This paper presents an experimental tool allowing the user to inject failures
during a practical evaluation of fault-tolerant systems. We illustrate the usefulness
of our tool through an evaluation of a hierarchical grid failure detector.
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1 Introduction
A current trend in high-performance computing is the use of large-scale computing
grids. These platforms consist of geographically distributed cluster federations gather-
ing thousands of nodes. At this scale, node and network failures are no more exceptions,
but belong to the normal system behavior. Thus grid applications must tolerate failures
and their evaluation should take reaction to failures into account.
To be able to evaluate a fault-tolerant application, it is essential to test how the
application reacts to failures. But such applications are often non deterministic and
failures are not predictable. However, an extensive experimental evaluation requires
execution reproducibility.
In this paper, we introduce a failure injection tool able to express and reproduce var-
ious failure injection scenarios. This provides the ability to extensively evaluate fault-
tolerance mechanisms used by distributed applications. As an illustration, we use this
tool to evaluate a failure detector service adapted to the grid architecture [7]. A fail-
ure detector is a well-known basic building block for fault-tolerant distributed systems,
since most fault-tolerance mechanisms require to be notified about failures. These ex-
periments are run over the Grid’5000 National French grid platform [1].
The remainder of this paper is composed as follows: Section 2 motivates the need of
failure injection mechanisms. Section 3 describes our failure injection tool and explains
how to use it. Section 4 presents the failure detector we evaluate. Section 5 illustrates
the usage of our failure injection tool for a practical evaluation of the failure detector.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Experimenting with various volatility conditions
2.1 System model
In this paper, we suppose that the grid architecture of the system implies a hierarchical
organization. It consists of clusters of nodes with high-connectivity links, typically Sys-
tem Area Networks (SAN) or Local Area Networks (LAN), interconnected by a global
network, such as Internet. In this context, we call local group each pool of processes
running within the same SAN or LAN, and global network the network which connects
the local groups.
Each local group is a finite set of processes that are spread throughout a local net-
work. The distributed system is composed of a finite set of local groups. Every process
communicates only by sending and receiving messages. All processes are assumed to
have a preliminary knowledge of the system’s organization.
We rely on the model of partial synchrony proposed by Chandra and Toueg in [12].
This assumption fit the behavior of a typical computing grid: nodes crashes are possible
and messages may be delayed or dropped by routers during network congestion.
Note that the two levels of the grid hierarchy exhibit different properties for com-
munications (latency, bandwidth, message loss rate).
2.2 Benefits of experimentation.
A theoretical evaluation of a system can be carried out using a formal proof of a sys-
tem model, which can validate the system design. However, it relies on a formal model,
which is generally a simplification of the reality (taking into account only significant
parameters). A second type of evaluation uses extensive simulations [9,15,11], which
as formal proof, generally run models of the design and not the implementation itself.
Finally, experimentations on real testbeds can serve as a proof of concept. Such a prac-
tical evaluation can capture aspects related, for instance, to the node specifications or
to specifics of the underlying physical network. In this paper we focus on experimental
evaluations.
Experimenting large-scale distributed software is difficult. The tests have to be de-
ployed and launched on thousands of geographically distributed nodes, then the results
have to be collected and analyzed. Besides, the tests have to be reproducible. Achieving
these tasks for a large-scale environment is not a trivial task.
2.3 Controlling volatility
In the context of large-scale, fault-tolerant distributed systems, one important aspect
which needs to be controlled is node volatility. This section introduces a tool that pro-
vides the ability to inject failures according to pre-defined scenarii during experiments,
in order to evaluate the quality of fault-tolerance mechanisms. More specifically, we
illustrate how such a tool can be used in order to test a failure-detection service.
Failure injection requirements. The use of failure injection mechanisms provides the
ability to test fault-tolerant mechanisms with different volatility conditions. This may
validate that the service provided by the software is still available when particular types
of failures occur. It also provides the ability to measure the overhead introduced by the
fault-tolerant mechanism to support different kinds of failures.
The experimentations are run on a testbed that is assumed to be stable. As we want
to experiment with controlled failures, we assume that there are no other unexpected
failures during the test (in case of a real failure, the developer will have to re-launch
his test). The test tool can help the developer to introduce controlled failures during
the experimentation. In order to emulate some specific scenarios and to be scalable, the
test tool has to provide a simple and efficient way to describe failures distributed across
thousands of nodes.
The failure injection mechanisms should be able to take only statistical parameters
and then compute failure schedules accordingly. This allows the tester to generate a
failure scenario across thousands of nodes by giving only a few parameters. The failure
injection mechanisms also need to be highly customizable allowing the user to specify
groups of nodes that should fail simultaneously. More generally, they need to provide
the availability to express failure dependencies between nodes. This should allow the
tester to emulate correlated failures. Furthermore, an important feature of a failure in-
jector (volatility controller) is reproducibility. Even if failures are computed using sta-
tistical parameters, one may want to replay an execution with the same set of failures,
while varying other parameters (e.g. in order to tune the fault-tolerance algorithms).
While experimenting various parameters of a fault tolerance feature or testing differ-
ent fault tolerance mechanisms one may want to compare different solutions within the
same context.
Scenarios.
Simple failure scheme. One simple way to describe a failure scheme is to assume that
all the nodes have the same probability of failure and that they are independent (i.e the
failure of a particular node does not depend on the failure of other ones). For instance,
one may assume that the MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures) of a particular set of
nodes may be one hour. The MTBF of a specific architecture can be easily observed.
The developer may wish to run experiments with smaller MTBF values in order to stress
the fault-tolerant mechanisms.
Correlated failures. As the underlying physical network system may be very com-
plex, with hubs and switches, some failures may induce new ones. The crashes of some
nodes may lead to the crashes of other nodes. By instance, while running a software
on a cluster federation, a whole cluster may crash (Figure 1). This may be due to a
power failure in one cluster room, for instance. While designing a fault-tolerant system
for such an architecture, it is important to experiment its behavior while multiple fail-
ures occurs concurrently as it may happen in real executions (without failure injection
mechanisms).
Accurate control. As the roles played by the different nodes in the system may not be
strictly equivalent (some are more critical than others), the developer should be able to
test some particular cases. For instance, one may want to experiment the simultaneous
crash of two particular nodes, or the crash of a node when it is in a particular state.
Typically, as illustrated by Figure 1, experimenting the failure of a node having manager
capabilities may be really interesting as it may involve particular cases of the fault-
tolerant algorithms.
2.4 Related work
Researchers working in the fault-tolerance area need to inject failures during their ex-
periments. Most often this is done in an ad-hoc manner, by manually killing nodes or
by introducing a few code statements into the tested system’s source code, to make fail-
ures occur. The overhead for the tester is non negligible and usually it is neither scalable
nor reproducible. The goal of our failure injection mechanism is precisely to automate
this task, making it easy for the testers to inject failures at large scale and to control
volatility conditions.
Many research efforts focus on failure injection. However, most of them are very
theoretical or focus on the problem of failure prediction [18,17,6]. In this paper we do
not address the issue of when a failure should be injected or what it will induce, but we
provide a practical solution to how to inject it. The tester may use the results of these
previous research works to feed our failure injectors.
Failure injection has also been studied for simulation and emulation. For instance,
[3] provides a solution to test protocols under failure injection, but it relies on a fully
centralized approach. Our work is intended to be used for tests running on real dis-
tributed architectures, with the full application code.
FAIL [14] (FAult Injection Language) defines a smart way to define failures sce-
narios. It relies on a compiler to trap application communications to emulate failures.
Our work is integrated in the test environment, not at application level, thus it allows to
inject failures even when the source code is unavailable.
In contrast to previous work, we use failure mechanisms within a test tool, providing
a simple way to deploy, run and fetch results of a test under various controlled volatility
conditions.
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Fig. 1. Different kinds of failures
(00) <network analyze-class="test.Analyze">
(01) <profile name="manager" replicas="1">
(02) <!-- peer information -->
(03) <peer base-name="peerA"/>
...
(11) <bootstrap class="test.MyClass1"/>
(12) <!-- argument -->
(13) <arg value="x"/>
(14) </profile>
(15) <profile name="non-manager" replicas="20">
(16) <peer base-name="peerB"/>
...
(23) <bootstrap class="test.MyClass2"/>
(24) </profile>
(25) </network>
Fig. 2. JDF’s description language
3 Our proposal: a flexible failure injection tool
3.1 JXTA Distributed Framework (JDF).
We are currently developing our failure injection mechanism within the JXTA Dis-
tributed Framework (JDF [19,4]) tool. The JDF project has been initiated by Sun
Microsystems, and is currently being actively developed within the PARIS Research
Group [2]. JDF is a tool designed to automate the tests of JXTA-based systems. In [4]
we have specified that this kind of tool should provide the ability to control the simula-
tion of nodes’ volatility. In the remaining of this section we show how to provide this
ability inside JDF. A detailed description of JDF can be found in [19].
JDF allows the user to describe his test through 3 configuration files. 1) a node file
containing the list of nodes on which the test is run, 2) a file storing the names and paths
of the files to deploy on each node, and 3) a XML file describing the node profiles, in
particular, the Java classes associated and the parameters given to these classes.
JDF’s XML description file allows the tester to describe his whole system through
profiles. Figure 2 defines two profiles, one from line 01 to 14 and one from line 15 to
24. Then multiple nodes can share a same profile. The profile named non-manager on
Figure 2 is replicated on 20 different nodes (thanks to the replicas attribute). The first
experimentation phase consists of the creation of these files. This phase is called basic
configuration thereafter.
3.2 JDF description language extension.
The first requirement to fulfill in order to use failure injection is to incorporate failure
information is into the JDF test description language
To provide the ability to express failures dependencies (to represent correlated fail-
ures) we add a new XML tag: failure. This tag may have 2 attributes: 1) grp to indicate
that all nodes having this profile are part of a same failure group; 2) dep to indicate
that nodes having this profile depend, from a failure point of view, on nodes of another
profile. The grp attribute allows to specify groups of nodes that should fail together
(i.e. if one of them crashes, then all the set crashes). This can help the tester to simu-
late the failure of clusters, for instance. The dep attribute can be used to indicate that a
node should crash if another one crashes (by instance to emulate the fact that the sec-
ond node may serve as a gateway for the first one). For instance, in Figure 2, adding
the line “(17) <failure grp="1"/>” in the non-manager profile will make all the non-
manager nodes crash as soon as on of them crashes. Furthermore, if the line “(18) <fail-
ure dep="manager"/>” is added, all non-manager nodes will crash if the node having
manager profile crashes.
3.3 Computing the failure Schedule.
We have developed a tool that generates a configuration file with volatility-related pa-
rameters (e.g. the global MTBF) which are given as an input to JDF. To do this, we
introduce a new configuration file. In order to make the failure conditions reproducible,
this file contains the uptimes for all nodes (i.e. the failure schedule). It is generated us-
ing the XML description file, which is necessary in order to take into account failure
dependencies. This phase is called failure schedule generation thereafter.
The tool works as follows: it computes the first date using a given MTBF and the
number of nodes (obtained from the XML description file), then it randomly chooses a
node to which it assigns this first failure date. This operation is repeated until a failure
date is assign to each node. Next, dependency trees are built using the information
contained in the XML description file. The dependency trees are used to ensure that 1)
in each failure group, nodes are assigned the smallest failure date of the group; 2) if the
failure date of a node is greater than the failure date of a node on which it depends (the
dep attribute), then the smallest date is assigned. This way, all dependencies expressed
in the XML description file are satisfied.
Computing the failure schedule statically before launching the test allows the tester
to easily reproduce failure conditions. The tool can be launched once to compute a
failure schedule, and the same computed schedule can be used by multiple experiments.
3.4 Running experiments with failure injection.
Assuming that the standard JDF configuration files exist (i.e. the basic configuration
phase has been done), the complexity overhead induced by the failure injection mecha-
nisms to launch tests is very low.
To run a test by providing a MTBF value (Simple failure scheme) the tester has to
launch a JDF script that will compute the failure dates before running his test (boxes
A, C and E in Figure 3).
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Fig. 3. Failure injection usage
The failure schedule generation phase consist in executing a script with the desired
MTBF value and the JDF standard configuration files.
As a further step, to use correlated failures, the tester needs to use our JDF descrip-
tion language extension. In this case, one Failure configuration phase is required to add
failure tags in the XML configuration file (Box B in Figure 3).
Finally, the tester may need an accurate control of the failures (i.e inject a failure on
a specific node at a specific time). To do this, the failure schedule has to be explicitly
edited (Box D in Figure 3).
Once the schedule is computed no extra step is needed to re-execute an experiment
with the same failure conditions.
3.5 Run time failure injection.
At deployment time, a configuration file containing the failure schedule is sent to each
node. At launch time, a killer thread is started. This thread reads the failure date (which
is actually an uptime), then waits accordingly. If the application is still running at the
failure date, this thread kills it, thereby emulating a failure. Note that all the application
threads are killed, but the physical node itself remains up and running. If an application
uses the TCP protocol, the node will answer immediately that no process is currently
listening to this port. If the node were really down, the application would have to wait
for a TCP time-out. In the case of the UDP protocol (as for the experiments presented
in this paper), this side-effect does not exist. For applications using the TCP protocol,
the thread killer should either trap messages or really shutdown the network interface.
4 A scalable failure detection service
We used the failure injection mechanisms previously described to evaluate a scalable
failure detector adapted to hierarchical grids.
4.1 Unreliable failure detectors
Concepts. Since their introduction by Chandra and Toueg in [12], failure detectors are
becoming a basic building block for fault-tolerant systems. A failure detector is one
solution to circumvent the impossibility [13] of solving deterministically the consensus
in asynchronous systems in presence of failure. The aim of failure detectors is to provide
information about the liveness of other processes. Each process has access to a local
failure detector which maintains a list of processes that it currently suspects of having
crashed. Since a failure detector is unreliable, it may erroneously add to its list a process
which is still running. But if the detector later realizes that suspecting this process is a
mistake, it then removes the process from its list. Failure detectors are characterized
by two properties: completeness and accuracy. Completeness characterizes the failure
detector capability of suspecting incorrect process permanently. Accuracy characterizes
the failure detector capability of not suspecting correct processes.
We focus on the

detector, named Eventually Perfect, it is one of failure detector
classes, which enable to solve the consensus problem (i.e. it is not the weakest). This
detector requires the following characteristics:
Strong completeness: there is a time after which every process that crashes is per-
manently suspected by every correct process.
Eventual strong accuracy: there is a time after which correct processes are not
suspected by any correct process.
Utility. A failure detector

provides the ability to solve the consensus, but it does
not contradict the impossibility of Fischer, Lynch and Paterson, then it is impossible to
implement it in asynchronous systems.
A failure detector has several advantages from a theoretical and a practical point of
view. The first one is to abstract synchronism matter: algorithms that use a failure de-
tector depends on failure only. The hypotheses, in terms of completeness and accuracy,
describe how a failure detector detects other processes failures. These hypotheses are
more natural than temporal ones but also useful.
In a practical way, the need to detect failures is a common denominator among the
majority of distributed reliable applications. In fact an application must know if one
of these processes has crashed: to be able to replace it in case of replication or more
generally to avoid waiting infinitely its result. From this perspective, a failure detector
is a specific service which provides the ability to guarantee the application vivacity.
This service can be shared by several applications and then its cost is amortized.
4.2 GFD (GRID Failure Detector)
Properties. The aim of our failure detector is to propose a shared and moreover scal-
able detection service among several applications. In this implementation we dissociate
two aspects: a basic layer which computes an estimation of the expected arrival date
to provide a short detection time and an adaptation layer specific for each application.
This adaptation layer guarantees the adequacy between the detection quality of service
and the application needs. This architecture provides the ability to generate only one
flow of messages to provide adapted detection information for all applications.
The second specificity is the hierarchical organization of the detection service in
order to decrease the number of messages and the processor load [8]. It comprises two
levels: a local and a global one, mapped upon the network topology. The system is com-
posed of local groups, mapped upon SANs or LANs, bound together by a global group.
Each group is a detection space: every group member watches all the other members of
its group. Every local group designates at least one mandatory which will participate to
the global group.
This organization implies two different failure detector types. This distinction is
important since a failure does not have the same interpretation in the local context as
in the global one. A local failure corresponds to the crash of a host, whereas in the
global context a failure represents the crash of an entire local group. In this situation,
the ability to provide different qualities of service to the local and the global detectors
is a major asset of our implementation. Therefore a local group mandatory has two
different failure detectors, one for the local group and one for global group.
In a local group, the failure detector uses IP-Multicast for sending periodicals “I
am alive” messages. In SANs and LANs, IP-Multicast can be used with the broadcast
property. Therefore a host only sends one message to communicate with all the other
hosts. Failure detectors in a global group use UDP in order to be more compatible with
the general network security policy.
5 Experimentations
We use our tool to inject failures and measure the time it takes to detect them with our
failure detection service. Reproducibility is used to perform multiple experiments with
the same set of failure while tuning the failure detector. The correlated failure feature is
used to experiment the global level of the failure detector’s hierarchy.
5.1 Experimental setup.
For all the experiments, we used the Grid’5000 platform [1], which gathers 9 clusters
geographically distributed in France. These clusters are connected together through the
Renater Education and Research National Network (1 Gb/s). For our preliminary ex-
periments, we used 64 nodes distributed in 4 of these sites (Rennes, Lyon, Grenoble
and Sophia). In these 4 sites, nodes are connected through a gigabit Ethernet network
(1 Gb/s). This platform is hierarchical in terms of latency: a few milliseconds among
the clusters, around 0.05 within each cluster.
As our failure detector is hierarchical, with a local and a global level, the 64 nodes
are partitioned into 4 local groups, one in each cluster. Within each local group, a spe-
cial node (mandatory) is responsible for the failure detection at global level (i.e cluster
failures).
Even if our algorithms do not require a global clock assumption, for measurements
purposes, we assume a global clock. Each node runs a ntp (network time protocol) client
to synchronize its local clock and we assume that the local clock drifts are negligible (as
the test period is short, of the order of a few tens of minutes). This assumption stands
only for measurements purposes.
Performance metrics. The most important parameter of the failure detector is the de-
lay between heartbeats. It defines the time between two successive emissions of an
“I am alive” message. The failure injection is essentially characterized by the MTBF
(Mean Time Between Failure) and possibly by the correlation between failures de-
scribed in the test files. The experimental results are essentially expressed in terms
of detection latency. It corresponds to the elapsed time between a node crash and the
moment when the other nodes start suspecting it permanently.
5.2 Preliminary tests.
We started by evaluating the failure injection mechanisms alone. The goal is to assess
its ability to inject failures according to a given MTBF following an exponential distri-
bution. To do this, we launch 20 times a test with a MTBF value set to one minute, with
no failure dependencies. Before each test, the failure schedule is recomputed in order
to obtain mean failure dates. Figure 4 shows that the average number of alive nodes
decrease as the time elapses. The experimental results are close to the theoretical ones
obtained using an exponential distribution.
In a second experiment, we evaluated the ability of our failure injector to correctly
generate correlated failures. There again we assume the failures follow the same expo-
nential distribution. Besides, we add a failure dependency: all members of local group
1 (located in Rennes) depend on their mandatory (i.e. they must fail if the mandatory
fails). This results in a gap on Figure 5 when Rennes’ mandatory is killed, as all nodes
in Rennes fail concurrently. After this correlated failure happens, the slope of the curve
is smaller. This is due to the fact that the dependency made some failures happen sooner.
We can conclude that the failure injector is able to inject failures according to a
given MTBF and may also take into account correlated failures.
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Fig. 5. Correlated failures
5.3 Experimenting with the failure detector
Tradeoff: detection time versus network stress. The failure detector is hierarchical:
it provides failure detection in local groups (i.e clusters) and between these groups. We
first evaluate the detection time at local level (within local groups) according to the de-
lay between heartbeats of the failure detector. To do this evaluation, we set a MTBF of
30 seconds with no failure dependency, and no mandatory failures. During each run of
10 minutes, 18 nodes are killed. Figure 6 shows for each delay between heartbeats the
average failure detection time in local groups. The results are very close to what we ex-
pected: theoretically, the average detection time is 	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%( ). On the other hand, as the delay between heartbeats decreases, the number
of messages increases, as shown by figure 7. For a fixed accuracy of the failure detec-
tion, there is a tradeoff between detection time and network stress. This is why, through
adapters, our failure detector allows multiple applications to share the same heartbeat
flow to minimize the network load.
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Fig. 6. Local detection times
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Fig. 7. Network stress
Correlated failures. The aim of this second experiment is to evaluate the detection
time at the global level. At this level, the failure detection is done through the local
group mandatories. When the failure of a mandatory is detected in a group, a new
one is designated to replace it with an average measured nomination delay of 156ms.
Thus, to experiment failure detection at global level, we need to use correlated fail-
ures in order to induce the crash of whole local groups. We emulate the failure of
sites by introducing a failure dependency between the members of a group (i.e nodes
in one site) and their mandatory. By instance, for the Rennes cluster, we add: <fail-
ure dep="RennesInitialMandatory"/> in the profiles of Rennes’ non-initially manda-
tory nodes.
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Fig. 8. Global detection times
During a 10 minutes run, 3 out of 4 mandatories are killed. Figure 8 shows the
average failure detection times according to the delay between heartbeats. The results
are similar to the ones obtained in local groups. The irregularity comes from the fact that
less failures occur than for the previous tests. It is important to note that the correlated
failures feature is mandatory to perform these measurements as a whole site should fail.
6 Conclusion and future work
In grid environments, building and evaluating fault-tolerant softwares is a hard task. In
this paper, we present a test environment providing failure injection features, allowing
the developer to control volatility without altering the application code. To illustrate
this tool, we evaluate a hierarchical failure detection service. First, our experiments
have show that our failure injection tool is able to provide accurate volatility control in a
reproducible manner. This allowed us to evaluate a hierarchical failure detection service
by emulating independent and correlated failures. In each of these two cases, we have
run multiple experiments for different configurations of the failure detector. The results
show that the faults are efficiently detected. To the best of our knowledge, no failure
detectors have been experimented in the past using automated failure injection on grid
platforms.
We plan to further enhance our test environment by adding support for message
loss injection. This can be done through network emulation tools like Dummynet [16]
or NIST Net [10]. The failure description language will be extended accordingly, in
order to incorporate message loss description. Furthermore we will use this test envi-
ronment to evaluate the fault tolerance mechanisms of higher-level grid service (e.g. the
JUXMEM [5] data sharing service).
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